Developments in private enforcement of Italian antitrust law: the introduction of “class action” legislation

1. The main features of the Italian class action system

Object
As from 1st January 2010, a new procedural tool for the protection of consumers, the class action, is now available in the Italian legal system.

The Italian legislation on class actions was initially sketched out in the 2006 “Codice del Consumo” (hereinafter “Consumer Act”) and then largely reshaped in July 2009 by Law n. 99/09 amending the Consumer Act. Whilst the new rules apply from 1st January, a partial retroactivity regime allows for class actions to be brought forward in respect to events occurred on or after 16th August 2009 (the actual date of entry into force of Law n. 99/09).

The matters which can trigger a class action are: (i) contractual liability of an undertaking stemming from application of disproportionate obligations excessively bearing on the consumer party; (ii) tort liability for damages caused to consumers by defaulting products; and (iii) liability for damages suffered by consumers as a consequence of an undertaking’s unfair commercial practices or anticompetitive conducts.

Class actions constitute a new instrument consumers can rely on for the safeguard of certain individual rights already enforceable with individual lawsuits before courts. Thus, class actions are an alternative, rather than a substitute, to the existing judicial remedies available to consumers, which are by no means affected by the entry into force of the class action.

Pursuant to the new regime, a single complainant is now entitled to lodge, on behalf of a group of individuals sharing an identical position and the same interest vis-à-vis a given undertaking, a civil lawsuit against the same undertaking for compensation of damages caused as a consequence of unlawful conducts impacting on consumers.

It is important to note that, according to general rules, class actions can only aim to recover actual damages suffered by consumers, punitive damages being expressly non pursuable in the Italian legal system.

Procedure
Competence to hear the class action lies with the lower civil court (the “Tribunale”) of the capital city of the region where the defendant has its registered office, regardless of the amount of the claim.

Class actions are subject to a preliminary admissibility assessment by the competent civil court, which can reject the claim when: (i) the same is manifestly unfounded, (ii) a conflict of interests exists between the class action members, (iii) the rights and claims of the class members are not identical, and (iv) the complainant does not seem able to adequately pursue the class interest throughout the whole proceeding (for instance, where it may lack the organizational and financial means necessary to adequately support the action).

Once admitted by the court, class actions shall be duly publicized so as to allow for interested consumers to “opt-in” within the set deadline by adhering to the collective claim, which entails the waiver of any statutory rights to lodge a stand-alone lawsuit on the same claims brought forward in the class action. After the “opt-in”
phase, the proceeding follows the ordinary trial procedure before the competent court, which shall render -
based on the evidence submitted by the parties - a judgment either rejecting the action, or condemning the
defendant to pay damages to the class action members. Transaction agreements between class members and
defendant are possible throughout the proceeding; however, these agreements are exclusively binding
on those class members expressly accepting them.

A key issue: the admissibility of the class action and the "class interest"
The court assessment of the admissibility of the class action is a key procedural step on which plaintiffs and
defendants are expected to confront vigorously, provided that a finding of inadmissibility by the court would
preclude from the outset the class action proceeding.
The most complex admissibility test has to do with the existence of identical rights within the consumers class
as represented by the class action, as regards both the title of their claim and the type of damage suffered.
Indeed, in order to rule class actions as admissible, courts are called to verify, on a case by case basis, that
the class lawsuit actually endorses the identical, homogeneous interest of a whole consumer group. Should
the court conclude that the class action is not underpinned by identical rights of all consumers within the
class, the class action must be rejected by the court as inadmissible in its entirety. It is apparent, here, the
difference between the Italian system and other legal systems (for instance the US) which allow some degree
of differentiation, within the same class action, amongst consumers’ individual rights, which are then grouped
in categories.

2. Class actions aimed at recovering damages suffered by consumers as a
consequence of an undertaking’s anticompetitive conducts or unfair
commercial practices

The scope for class actions in the enforcement of antitrust and unfair commercial practices provisions
The possibility for consumers to employ class actions to recover damages caused to them by anticompetitive
or commercial unfair practices opens new perspectives for antitrust and consumer law enforcement in Italy,
an area traditionally subject to the initiative of the public administration, namely the Italian Competition
Authority (hereinafter, “ICA”) which is competent to enforce EC and national antitrust rules as well as the
provisions on unfair commercial practices provided for in the Consumer Act.

It is expected that class actions will focus on unlawful practices which have immediate repercussions on
consumers’ welfare and are, as such, more immediately perceived as damaging.
This is the case, for example, of price-fixing cartels at retail level, or abuses of dominance consisting in
exploitative conducts (for instance, excessive pricing, unlawful tie-ins, etc.) directly affecting consumers in
their everyday life, as is the case with utilities and TLCs, or retail banking and insurance services. As regards
unfair commercial practices, the provision in the Consumer Act of a “black list” of prohibited conducts
(amongst which, for example, are bundling and tie-in of unrelated products, unsolicited activation of pay
services and unilateral worsening of contractual conditions applied to consumers) as well as the more
immediate link between the conduct and the damage caused to customers (as opposed to antitrust
infringements, where the damage suffered by customers is sometimes hard to identify) should facilitate the
diffusion of class actions.
That said, it is to be seen whether the prospect of success of class actions in antitrust damage claims might
be undermined by certain procedural gaps which have so far limited the development of antitrust private
enforcement before Italian civil courts, namely: burden of proof, access to evidence and quantification of
damages.
The burden of proof in class actions related to antitrust private enforcement

A procedural issue which has been arising throughout Europe in the context of actions for the recovery of damages caused by anticompetitive practices (cartels and abuses of dominance), concerns the burden for plaintiffs to prove the existence of a causation link between the unlawful conduct of the undertaking and the damage suffered by the plaintiffs, absent the availability of discovery orders in Italian court proceedings.

As with individual damage actions, the burden of proof in class actions is regulated by the general rules of the Italian Civil Code (article 2697) according to which “it is up to the plaintiff to prove the foundation of its claims”.

Yet, the burden of proving a causation link between conduct and damage weighs differently with respect to collective antitrust damage claims, as opposed to the other domains in which the class actions may be employed, i.e. a manufacturer’s liability for faulty products, an undertaking’s liability for disproportionate contractual obligations, or unfair commercial practices imposed on consumers.

In the latter areas, it is the substantive law (tort, contractual, and consumer protection law respectively) which qualifies a conduct as unlawful and liable to directly affect consumers. Thus, the proof of the causation link between the undertaking’s conduct and the damage caused to the consumers is an immediate consequence of the finding of a breach of law, given that the law aims to protect consumers’ rights in the first place.

Conversely, because antitrust rules aim primarily to safeguard markets and to protect consumers by ensuring that market competition is sound, in antitrust damage claims a specific and separate legal burden of proof bears on the plaintiff to demonstrate that an undertaking’s conduct, aside from being in breach of articles 101 or 102 of the EC Treaty (or corresponding national rules), has also caused an actual damage to the consumers who have purchased the goods or services concerned by the antitrust violation. Often, the judicial proof of the actual damage suffered by consumers bears on complex economic analysis arguments, which courts are generally unfamiliar with. Additionally, being unable to plead the court for the issuing of discovery orders, consumers are left with little, if any, chance to access documental evidence to substantiate their claims.

An important attempt to bypass the described procedural shortcomings has been made by the Italian Supreme Court, which in a number of judgments (no. 2305/2007, and more recently no. 3638/2009) has stated that the decisions adopted by the Italian Competition Authority ascertaining the liability of an undertaking for antitrust infringements could be regarded as “privileged evidence” of the liability of the same undertaking for damages caused to consumers, sufficient as such for an inversion of the burden of proof between the parties in civil court trials, save in any case the successful rebuttal of proof by the defendant. Based on this case law, consumers should now be able to rely more heavily on the ICA’s findings of an infringement in order to prove a causation link between the unlawful conduct acknowledged by the ICA and the damage suffered by them, which in any case still has to be fully proved in its exact amount in the context of the civil trial.

In a different vein, probably acknowledging the difficulties consumers may face in starting up damage actions against undertakings, the new provisions of the Consumer Act (article 140 bis paragraph 3) expressly provide the possibility for the court to stay the class action proceedings and not to decide on the admissibility of the class action, until the conclusion of either a pending investigation by an independent authority (the ICA or the European Commission) or an appeal against an independent authority’s decision before the competent courts (the Italian administrative courts or the European courts), when such investigation concerns the same findings challenged by the class action.

It seems that such provision, aside being compliant with article 16 of EC Regulation 1/2003 (which prevents national courts from adopting judgments that might clash with a Commission’s decision ascertaining a violation of articles 81/82 of the EC Treaty), tends to favor “follow-on” class actions bearing as much as possible – to the benefit of consumers – on the findings of the administrative investigation.
The interplay between public and private enforcement of antitrust and unfair commercial practices provisions

Because of the above mentioned procedural shortcomings impacting on the private enforcement system, the activity of the ICA as public enforcer – albeit independent to the activity of courts – will be in all likelihood the basis for most class actions for recovery of damages stemming from antitrust infringements or unfair commercial practices.

For companies involved in antitrust investigations before the ICA or the Commission and which are particularly exposed to the risk of follow-on class actions, it can then be crucial to assess whether cooperation with the antitrust agencies during the administrative proceeding may affect their exposure to follow-on consumers class actions.

A tool which might limit the risk for companies of being exposed to follow-on class actions relies on the possibility, provided for by EC Regulation 1/2003 and by the Italian antitrust law (article 14 ter of Law n. 287/90), to offer - prior to the conclusion of the antitrust investigation - commitments able to remedy the unlawful conduct identified by the investigating antitrust authority. Apart from avoiding fines by the ICA at the end of the administrative proceeding, a commitment decision would benefit the concerned undertakings as it would deprive potential class action plaintiffs of a formally binding infringement decision they could rely on as privileged evidence in court to substantiate their damage claims.

3. Conclusions

If the introduction of the class action in the Italian legal system appears to be a step forward in the protection of consumer rights in Italy, attention should be paid to avoid a populist drift, with a proliferation of actions capable of causing great damage to the industry and little benefits to consumers.

The possibility for large numbers of consumers to team together in suing companies for recovery of damages originated by unlawful practices is expected to work as a catalyst for so far “imploded” litigation to emerge, as both the scope of the interests at stake, and the financial economies of scale achievable through class lawsuits would make it easier, and at the same time more profitable, for consumers to pursue this kind of collective claims before courts. The constituency of consumers associations would play, at least in the initial phase, a key role in bringing forward the class actions, and this would likely reflect in a ever growing importance of consumer associations as policy stakeholders.

For companies, the costs of being involved in class litigation might go beyond the financial costs they would have to bear as a result of an adverse class judgment, as they would be facing high reputation damages considering the high level of publicity required by the Consumer Act to ensure that affected consumers are fully aware of their right to join the class action.